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NOTE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION IN NEW MEXICO:
PRE-EXISTING CONDITIONS AND THE
SUBSEQUENT INJURY ACT
Fifty years ago New Mexico enacted its first workmen's compen-2
sation law,' a plan surprisingly similar to the plan in practice today.
During this fifty-year period, the New Mexico Legislature and the
New Mexico Supreme Court have been required to give continual
attention to the problems raised by workmen's compensation claimants. In 1961 both the legislature and the court recognized the need
for a "second injury" or a "subsequent injury" fund." 4The legislature responded by passing a Subsequent Injury Act.
The New Mexico court has always had a liberal view toward
compensation claims.' This liberal view extended to permit recovery
by the worker whose injury was allegedly or actually precipitated by
some physical or mental condition having no connection with his
work. Pre-existing conditions were not bars to recovery. The purpose of this Note is to review the pre-existing condition cases in New
1. N.M. Laws 1917, ch. 83 (superseded 1929).
2. For example, the first act included provisions for increasing compensation if the
worker were injured or killed because the employer failed to provide safety appliances
required by law; the first act included also provisions for decreasing compensation if
the worker's injury or death resulted from his failure to use safety appliances provided.
N.M. Laws 1917, ch. 83, § 7 (superseded 1929).
3. In Reynolds v. Ruidoso Racing Ass'n, 69 N.M. 248, 365 P.2d 671 (1961), the
New Mexico court lamented that New Mexico was one of six states in the nation that
had never established second injury funds. Reynolds, decided in August, 1961, overlooked the fact that the 1961 New Mexico Legislature had passed a Subsequent Injury
Act providing that as of the effective date of July 1, 1961, there was established a subsequent injury fund. N.M. Laws 1961, ch. 134; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-26 to -138 (Supp.
1965).
The idea of a subsequent injury act was preceded by a provision allowing employers to limit their liability by requiring employees to certify the nature and extent of any
pre-existing disability. N.M. Laws 1959, ch. 67, § 30; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-37 (Repl.
1960). Also, an employer whose employee had already lost a scheduled body member
was not liable for total disability compensation if the employee lost the other body member in the course of his employment. N.M. Laws 1959, ch. 67, § 22; N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 59-10-18.4 (Repl. 1960).
4. N.M. Laws 1961, ch. 134.
5. E.g., Geeslin v. Goodno, Inc., 75 N.M. 174, 402 P.2d 156 (1965) ; Luvaul v. A.
Ray Barker Motor Co., 72 N.M. 447, 384 P.2d 885 (1963).

Mexico, to discuss the Subsequent Injury Act, and to explore the
interrelationship between recovery for pre-existing conditions and
recovery under the Subsequent Injury Act.
I
INTRODUCTION TO NEW MEXICO WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAW

Under New Mexico law, the injured worker must prove three
elements in order to recover for his injury: (1) there was an accidental injury; (2) it arose out of the employment, and (3) it arose
in the course of the employment.6 An "accident" may occur even
though the injury developed over a period of months until one day
the physical condition of the employee made him unable to work.7
Catching pneumonia is an "accident." 8 Being bitten by a poisonous
insect is an "accident." ' In short, any " 'unlooked for mishap' " or
" 'untoward event which is not expected or designed' " is an accident within the meaning of the workmen's compensation law. 10
The requirement that the injury arise out of the employment refers to the cause of the injury.1 For example, the workman who was
killed during a storm when a tree fell on him suffered an injury arising out of his employment.' 2 However, handling a forbidden object
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-13.3 (Repl. 1960) : A. Claims for workmen's compensation shall be allowed only: (1) when the workman has sustained an accidental injury
arising out of, and in the course of his employment; (2) when the accident was reasonably incident to his employment; and (3) when the disability is a natural and direct
result of the accident.
7. Webb v. New Mexico Pub. Co., 47 N.M. 279, 141 P.2d 333 (1943) (printer allergic to hand soap) : "An injury may be gradual and progressive . . . ." Id at 286, 141
P.2d at 337.
8. Stevenson v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 45 N.M. 354, 115 P.2d 342 (1941).
9. Barton v. Skelly Oil Co., 47 N.M. 127, 138 P.2d 263 (1943).
10. Stevenson v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., supra note 8, at 367, 115 P.2d at 350.
11. Walker v. Woldridge, 58 N.M. 183, 268 P.2d 579 (1954). In Berry v. J. C.
Penny Co., 74 N.M. 484, 394 P.2d 996 (1964), the court said:
This court . . . has interpreted 'arising out of employment' to require a showing
that the injury was caused by a peculiar or increased risk to which claimant, as distinguished from the general public, was subjected by his employment.
Id. at 485-86, 394 P.2d at 997.
12. Merrill v. Penasco Lumber Co., 27 N.M. 632, 204 P. 72 (1922). The Merrill
case seems to have started the New Mexico court's concern with distinguishing accidents
common to the public generally (workman not entitled to compensation) from accidents made more likely by the employment (if other tests are met, workman is entitled
to compensation).
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while performing one's job removes the subsequent accident from
the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Disobeying instructions means that the accompanying injury did not arise out of
3
the employment.'
While "arising out of" refers to cause, "in the course of employment" refers to time, place, and circumstances surrounding the injury. 4 The debatable issue here often centers on the situation where
the employee was en route to work or was en route home from work.
If the employee was paid travel time or expenses or was planning to
perform some errand for the employer, the New Mexico court is inclined to find that the employee was acting in the course of his employment although the accident occurred during nonworking hours 5
and although the Workmen's Compensation Act specificially excludes injuries suffered "going or coming" from work.'
Violent and unexplained deaths occurring on the premises of the
employer are presumed to have arisen out of and in the course of
7
employment, and are thus compensable. 1
13. Walker v. Woldridge, 58 N.M. 183, 268 P.2d 579 (1954) (tear gas pistol in
deputy sheriff's car discharged in face of filling station attendant who was inspecting
it in violation of instructions). Justice Sadler, concurring specially, suggests that injuries suffered through violation of instructions are "wilfully suffered" and hence
barred under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-8 (Repl. 1960) as "intentionally inflicted by
himself." Id. at 185-86, 268 P.2d at 580-81.
14. Ibid.
15. Recovery allowed in: Cuellar v. American Employers' Ins. Co. of Boston,
Mass., 36 N.M. 141, 9 P.2d 865 (1932) ; McKinney v. Dorlac, 48 N.M. 149, 146 P.2d
867 (1944) ; Barrington v. Johnn Drilling Co., 51 N.M. 172, 181 P.2d 166 (1947) ; Wilson v. Rowan Drilling Co., 55 N.M. 81, 227 P.2d 365 (1950) ; Feldhut v. Latham, 60
N.M. 87, 287 P.2d 615 (1955) (in this case one employee who was asleep in the car
when the accident occurred was denied recovery; the employees who were awake received compensation) ; Brown v. Arapahoe Drilling Co., 70 N.M. 99, 370 P.2d 816
(1962).
Recovery denied in: Martinez v. Fidel, 61 N.M. 6, 293 P.2d 654 (1956) ; Ross v.
Marberry & Co., 66 N.M. 404, 349 P.2d 123 (1960) ; McDonald v. Artesia General
Hospital, 73 N.M. 188, 386 P.2d 708 (1963) ; Rinehart v. Mossman-Gladden, Inc., 77
N.M. 470, 423 P.2d 991 (1967).
16. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-12.12 (Supp. 1965): "injuries"... shall not include
injuries to any workman occurring while on his way to assume the duties of his employment or after leaving such duties . . ..
17. Medina v. New Mexico Consolidated Min. Co., 51 N.M. 493, 188 P.2d 343
(1947) (worker killed by a dynamite explosion in mine); Houston v. Lovington
Storage Co., 75 N.M. 60, 400 P.2d 476 (1965) (employee found crushed under storage
tank) ; Ensley v. Grace, 76 N.M. 691, 417 P.2d 885 (1966) (worker murdered by fellow
employee).

II
PRE-EXISTING DISABILITY

The New Mexico Supreme Court 18 has followed the generally accepted rule that previous disability, even though it caused or contributed to the accident for which compensation is claimed, is not a bar
to recovery under workmen's compensation; acceleration or aggravation of a pre-existing condition is also a compensable event.'"
Illuminative of the whole area is the solution of claims made
when workmen fall while on the job. In Christensen v. Dysart,20 the
decedent worker suffered a heart attack while standing on a platform; in falling to the ground he broke two ribs, punctured a lung,
and died. The trial court determined that the fall, not the heart attack, was the cause of death, and awarded compensation. The New
Mexico Supreme Court affirmed, preferring the rule: "if the injury
was due to the fall the employer is liable even though the fall was
caused by a pre-existing idiopathic condition. ' 21 In essence, the court
says that all events prior to the moment of death are inconsequential; it is the cause of death that determines whether the worker's
dependents will receive compensation.
The second case where a workman fell was in Luvaul v. A. Ray
Barker Motor Co.22 Here the workman apparently experienced an
epileptic seizure while standing in his employer's garage. When he
fell to the concrete floor he fractured his skull. The worker was denied compensation. Obviously his mistake was that he failed to hit
some object of machinery or related work instruments in the path of
his fall. The court stated the test for fall cases: "In what manner
' 23
did the employment contribute to the hazard of the fall?
This test for fall cases is a useful one for all cases involving preexisting disability. It could be paraphrased: in what manner did the
18. Under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 16-7-8 (Supp. 1966), future appeals of workmen's
compensation claims will be heard by the Court of Appeals rather than by the New
Mexico Supreme Court.
19. For a general review see Annots., 19 A.L.R. 95 (1922) and 28 A.L.R. 204
(1924).
20. 42 N.M. 107, 76 P.2d 1 (1938).
21. Id. at 111-12, 76 P.2d at 4. For a good discussion of idiopathic fall cases, with
emphasis on New Jersey law, see Note, 20 Rutgers L. Rev. 599 (1966).
22. 72 N.M. 447, 348 P.2d 885 (1963).
23. Id. at 455, 384 P.2d at 890. For a recent discussion of both Christensen and
Luvaul, see Williams v. City of Gallup, 77 N.M. 286, 421 P.2d 804 (1966).
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employment contribute to the hazard created by the pre-existing
condition? Seemingly a "but for" test, the factors are reversed:
"but for" the employment, the pre-existing condition would not have
been aggravated or the pre-existing condition would not have been
able to cause an industrial accident. The employer, on the other
hand, argues unsuccessfully that he should not be charged with liability: "but for" the pre-existing condition there would have never
been an accident.
For example, in Reynolds v. Ruidoso Racing Association,2 4 there
would not have been an injury at all had there not been a pre-existing bone disease. Reynolds was allowed compensation because the
disease "combined with" the incident at work to produce the disability. Recovery of compensation was permitted also in Webb v.
New Mexico Publishing Co.2 5 where the soap supplied by the employer created an allergic skin condition. One employee was affected
by the soap. This one employee, Webb, then sued for compensation
for the disability resulting from using the soap.
The acceleration and aggravation cases are other examples of injuries that would not have occurred "but for" the pre-existing condition. Yet acceleration and aggravation cases, almost without question, are handled as though there were no prior physical condition
that made the injury possible. 6 It is difficult to understand the distinction between acceleration or aggravation of a pre-existing condition and disability brought on at least in part because of a preexisting situation. What is the value in labeling one disability an
"aggravated pre-existing condition" and another disability a preexisting condition combined with an accidental injury? In either case
there would not have been any injury "but for" the pre-existing condition. With such analysis it becomes incomprehensible why courts
should have no hesitation in awarding full compensation in the aggravation cases but a mental struggle justifying recovery in the
"combined with" cases.
There are three New Mexico cases involving the significance, if
any, to be given the fact that the worker's injury is actually an aggravation or acceleration of a pre-existing condition: Gilbert v. E.B.
24.
25.
26.

69 N.M. 248, 365 P.2d 671 (1961).
47 N.M. 279, 141 P.2d 333 (1943).
See generally Annots., 19 A.L.R. 95 (1922) and 28 A.L.R. 204 (1924).
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Law and Son, 27 Seay v. Lea County 2Sand
and Gravel Co., 28 and
9
Lucero v. C.R. Davis ContractingCo.
Gilbert was a case where pneumonia was found to have hastened
a death by lung cancer; death by cancer was inevitable. The employer's liability remained the same-he paid full compensation as
though the cancer were not in its terminal stages.30 In Seay the workman had a history of back injuries; the injury on which he based his
workmen's compensation claim was an aggravation of earlier back
injuries. The employer was liable for the total present disability.8 '
Finally, in Lucero, the workman, a childhood tuberculosis victim,
was disabled by lung hemorrhages after breathing dust-laden air
while at work. The employer paid for the present disability.
The results in Seay and Lucero are justifiable: the record shows
that in each instance the employee had performed similar manual
labor for years free of any physical disability.32 However, in Gilbert
there is a tinge of the problem in the fall cases; the worker had the
good fortune to get his non-job-connected cancer connected with a
job-related incident. It is an unfortunate workman, indeed, whose
aggravation of a pre-existing condition occurs while off the job.
What is rarely, if ever, discussed in the cases is the probability that
any particular disability will be aggravated, regardless of the cause
of the aggravation. Underlying the question of whether or not the
job aggravated a pre-existing condition is an issue of fairness-fairness to all workmen-as well as fairness to the employer.
Where the "accident" occurs seems to be of greater significance
than what caused it. If this were not true, there would be more
claims based on job-related accidents that culminated and displayed
themselves while the employee was at home or elsewhere. This is
especially true in the heart attack cases. As long as Webb v. New
Mexico PublishingCo.-" allows employees to recover for a disability
that is a gradual development of job-related events, then it would
seem that a heart attack occurring at home should be just as compen27. 60 N.M. 101, 287 P.2d 992 (1955).
28. 60 N.M. 399, 292 P.2d 93 (1956).
29. 71 N.M. 11,375 P. 2d 327 (1962).
30. 60 N.M. at 110, 287 P.2d at 998.
31. This is the conclusion suggested by instruction No. 13, approved by the Supreme Court. 60 N.M. 402-03, 292 P.2d at 95.
32. Seay, 60 N.M. at 402, 292 P.2d at 95; Lucero, 71 N.M. at 13, 375 P.2d at 328.
33. 47 N.M. 279, 141 P.2d 333 (1943). This point is discussed in note 7 supra, and
accompanying text.
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sable as a heart attack occurring at work.34 It is strange that no reported New Mexico case has been found where the heart attack occurred away from the job site.
There is one notable case, Salazar v. County of Bernalillo,"5 involving an ultimately fatal cerebral hemorrhage that occurred several hours after the employee had a temper tantrum at work. Salazar, "a dedicated public servant," was overworked and emotionally
strained; the stroke occurred while he attended a night meeting of
the American Legion. Great emphasis was made in the trial court
that Salazar was in the scope of his employment when the stroke
occurred.36 Such emphasis seems entirely unnecessary. If Salazar's
stroke occurred as a result of overwork, where the stroke occurred
was unimportant. It is more likely that the elaborate proof that attending a night meeting was a part of Salazar's job was thought
necessary to overcome a strong defense that Salazar's stroke was
the result of a normal progression of a non-job-related disease.
III
SUBSEQUENT INJURIES

When an employer knows that he will be liable for an injury sustained by one of his employees in the course of employment, even if
the injury is traceable to a pre-existing condition, it is not surprising
that he hesitates to hire a person having a known disability. The
state, on the other hand, has an interest in seeing that all persons
desiring to work and able to perform some tasks be considered for
jobs available. The state wants to provide opportunities for handicapped people. The solution proposed by many states has been the
"second injury fund" or the similar "subsequent injury fund."
Under the second injury concept the statute typically provides
that where the employee has lost an eye, hand, arm, foot or leg prior
34. The heart attack cases where compensation was allowed all pinpointed some
event at work just prior to the employee's attack: Little v. J. Korber & Co., 71 N.M.
294, 378 P.2d 119 (1963) (supervisor became upset over error made by sales clerk) ;
Gray v. J. P. (Bum) Gibbins, Inc., 75 N.M. 584, 408 P.2d 506 (1965) (employee's job
of cranking a motor required extraordinary exertion) ; Hathaway v. New Mexico
State Police, 57 N.M. 747, 263 P.2d 690 (1953) (police captain led search party for
fugitive) ; Teal v. Potash Co. of America, 60 N.M. 409, 292 P.2d 99 (1956) (workman
became overheated on an unusually hot day); Sanchez v. Board of County Commissioners, 63 N.M. 85, 313 P.2d 1055 (1957) (employee was moving heavy boxes). In
Little, Gray, and Sanchez the workmen had histories of prior heart trouble.
35. 69 N.M. 464, 368 P.2d 141 (1962).
36. 69 N.M. at 470-71, 368 P.2d at 145-46.
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to employment, and he incurs an injury on the job, his employer is
liable only for the amount of disability suffered in the later accident
without regard to the earlier disability.37 For example, while the
loss of one hand may permit compensation for 125 weeks, being
without both hands is a total permanent disability entitling the
worker to compensation for 500 weeks.3 8 The employer, knowing
he will be liable for 500 weeks of compensation if his employee loses
both hands, will not hire a person who has already lost one hand.
The second injury plan prevents this discrimination against handicapped workers by providing that if the employer does hire a onehanded person who subsequently in the course of his employment
loses his other hand, the employer is liable for the scheduled injury
(loss of one hand is compensable for 125 weeks) and the second injury fund pays the remainder (375 weeks of compensation) .9
When New Mexico enacted its first comprehensive Subsequent
Injury Act in 1961,40 it wisely shied away from the wording "eye,
leg, arm, hand, foot." Instead, the legislature provided that any
permanent physical impairment could form the basis for operation
of the Subsequent Injury Act. 41 "Permanent physical impairment"
was defined as "a permanent physical condition which is, or which
37. E.g., Tenn. Code Ann.

§

50-1927 (Repl. 1966); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 39,

§ 57 (1964).
38. This example is based on the New Mexico schedule of injuries. N.M. Stat.
Ann. §§ 59-10-18.2, -18.4 (Repl. 1960, Supp. 1965).
39. For a description of the operation of second injury funds, see Maxwell, The
Second Injury Laws, 1959 Ins. L. J. 305; Doran, Second Injury Fund, 27 Texas B. J.
231 (1964); Herrington, Workmen's Compensation-The Second Injury Fund, 35 J.
Kan. B. Ass'n 167 (1966) ; 10 Kan. L. Rev. 347 (1961) ; 2 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law §§ 59.30 to -. 34 (1961).
40. N.M. Laws 1961, ch. 134. For mention of efforts in 1959 to establish the
second injury principle, see note 3 supra.
41. N.M. Stat. Ann § 59-10-134 (Supp. 1965): A. When an employee of an employer subject to the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act [59-10-1 to
59-10-37] who has a permanent physical impairment and who incurs a subsequent
disability by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, which results
in a permanent disability, that is materially and substantially greater than that which
would have resulted from the subsequent injury alone, then the employer or his insurance carrier shall pay awards of compensation for the combined condition of disability
as provided in section 11 of this Subsequent Injury Act [59-10-136] and all medical and
related expenses provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act [59-10-1 to 59-10-37].
B. If the subsequent disability of an employee with a permanent physical impairment
results in his death, the employer or his insurance carrier shall pay the compensation
for death according to section 11 of this Subsequent Injury Act, and all medical and
related expenses, including funeral expenses, provided by the Workmen's Compensation
Act. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-136 (Supp. 1965) provides that the liability for injury
shall be apportioned between the employer and the fund, and the employer shall be
reimbursed for any excess paid.
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is likely to be, an obstacle to employment. '4 2 Under the plan, a
worker has the percentage of his pre-existing physical impairment
certified to the superintendent of insurance." If the worker is then
injured on the job, the employer, after paying the first eight weeks
compensation plus medical expenses, pays compensation only for the
disability adjudged to have arisen out of the latest employment accident; the fund pays the remainder.44 The fund itself is derived
from a lump sum paid by an employer when one of his employees
dies leaving no dependent to claim a workmen's compensation benefit and from a percentage levy on employers.4 5
Thus far there have been no cases decided by the New Mexico
appellate courts that construe the Subsequent Injury Act. A number
of questions are raised by the wording of the act. Perhaps most serious is one touched upon in the discussion of the New Mexico preexisting condition cases: what is the liability of the employer if there
would not have been any accident at all had the employee been without the pre-existing condition? The New Mexico act seems to be
without an answer.4
The act provides, under "liability for payment," that:
In the event compensation benefits to which the employee is entitled
from the fund have not been reduced to judgment at the time the employer or his insurance carrier's liability for payment has ceased, the
employer or his insurance carrier shall continue to make the payments
to which the workman is entitled and the judgment shall provide reimbursement for such sums paid by the employer for which the fund
47
is adjudged liable.

This section sounds very much as though the employer is required
to predict correctly the outcome of a workmen's compensation claim
in the courts. In any disputed case the employer will not know
whether the employee will be found entitled to any compensation;
he certainly will not know the total percentage of disability that may
42. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-128 (Supp. 1965).
43. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-133 (Supp. 1965).
44. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-136 (Supp. 1965), quoted in part
45. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-129 (Supp. 1965).
46. See N.M. Stat. Ann § 59-10-134 (Supp. 1965) quoted
examples of statutes that specifically make the state fund totally
see Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 44-567 (1964) ; Minn. Stat. Ann. §
47. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-136 (D) (Supp. 1965).

in note 60 infra.
in note 41 supra. For
liable in this situation,
176.131 (1966) ; Ohio
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be found by the court and apportioned between the fund and the
employer's insurer.
Both the act and the related New Mexico case law suggest an
answer to the question of the proper way to calculate percentage
disability. For example, if an employee has a twenty-five per cent
permanent disability because of a childhood accident, and as a result
of a work-connected accident he becomes disabled an additional fifty
per cent, only thirty per cent of the disability being attributable to
the subsequent injury itself, does the fund pay forty-five per cent
disability (total present disability minus employer's liability) or
twenty per cent disability (total present disability minus employer's
liability minus the pre-existing percentage of disability) ? The answer in New Mexico clearly would appear to be that the fund pays
forty-five per cent disability (total present disability minus employer's liability).48
A more basic question about the Subsequent Injury Act is: does
it do what it was intended to do? It was intended to encourage the
employment of handicapped workers.4" Whether it actually does so
is questionable. Perhaps it is not unreasonable to take some of the
pre-existing condition cases discussed earlier and consider what
would have happened if the Subsequent Injury Act had been in effect
and pleaded.
In Christensen, where the decedent suffered a heart attack and
fell from a platform 0 (assuming here as in all cases discussed under
subsequent injury provisions that the workman had certified his disability) 5 it is very likely that the employer would have paid the total compensation claim just as though there had been no pre-existing
heart condition and no Subsequent Injury Act. This is because of a
expressed in states having subsequent injury acts: if the inprinciple
jury itself was sufficient to cause death or total disability, the fund
is not liable for any part of the settlement. 2 By the New Mexico
court's finding that Christensen's fall, and not his heart attack,
caused death, the employer becomes liable for the death.
48. Ryder v. Sandlin, 70 N.M. 377, 374 P.2d 133 (1962).
49. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-127 (Supp. 1965).
50. 42 N.M. 107, 76 P.2d 1 (1938). See text accompanying note 20 supra.
51. See text accompanying note 43 sutra.
52. Torelli v. Robert Hall Clothes, 9 App. Div. 2d. 147, 194 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1959)
Petroleum Maintenance Co. v. Herron, 201 Okla. 393, 206 P.2d 182 (1949) ; Jussila v.
Department of Labor and Industries, 59 Wash. 2d 772, 370 P.2d 582 (1962). Cf.
Superior Cafeteria and Lunch Co., Inc. v. Britton, 307 F.2d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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In Luvaul, where the claimant fell to the concrete floor during an
epileptic seizure, 3 the Subsequent Injury Act, again, would have
made no difference; the same result would have been expected.
The Subsequent Injury Act would have made very little difference
in Reynolds v. Ruidoso Racing Association"4 because Reynolds' bone
condition was not discovered until after his accident; apparently the
disease could not have been discovered by the routine examination
envisioned by the New Mexico act as a prerequisite to certifying a
pre-existing disability. In this connection it might be suggested that
a medical assignment of a percentage disability at the time of hiring
is useful because of the certainty it adds in calculating the employer's liability after a subsequent compensable accident, but a "preneed" determination is disadvantageous to the employer where, as
in Reynolds, the workman's disability could not be discovered during an examination preparatory to filing a disability certification
with the Commissioner of Insurance. In such a situation the workman
may have been certified as having no disability or a very small percentage of disability whereas in truth his hidden ailment is going to
cause or lead to an accident. The employer will have the whole bill
to pay. If there were no required prior assignment of a disability
percentage, the workman whose hidden ailment led to the injury
could get his total compensation from the fund rather than from
the employer. That is, of course, assuming that New Mexico courts
will rule that where a pre-existing condition caused the accident or
made possible the accident, the subsequent injury fund is liable for
the entire compensation award.5 5
The Reynolds problem would have been presented also by Webb
v. New Mexico Publishing Co., the soap allergy claim."6 Webb did
not know he was allergic to the soap provided by his employer until
after months of use. The Subsequent Injury Act would not have relieved the employer of any liability.
It is predictable that New Mexico's Subsequent Injury Act would
not shift liability in injury cases where the current employment aggravated or accelerated an old disease.57 The courts of other states
having subsequent injury acts have ruled that the employer is still
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
supra.

72 N.M. 447, 384 P.2d 885 (1963). See text accompanying note 22 supra.
69 N.M. 248, 365 P.2d 671 (1961). See text accompanying note 24 supra.
See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
47 N.M. 279, 141 P.2d 333 (1943). See text accompanying note 25 supra.
The three "aggravation" cases are discussed in the text beginning at note 27

OCTOBER 1967

NO TE

totally liable if his job aggravates or accelerates a pre-existing condition.5 8 Such a result seems inconsistent with the raison d'8tre of a
subsequent injury fund. Had there not been a pre-existing condition,
albeit dormant, there would have been nothing to aggravate or accelerate. Perhaps the solution is to calculate a table of probabilities
that a dormant condition will be aggravated, and then to assign a
percentage of disability based on that probability.
The employer in Salazar, the case involving a cerebral hemorrhage death,"9 could have benefited from the Subsequent Injury Act.
As noted earlier, the biggest issue was whether or not Salazar's
stroke resulted from a natural progression of his disease. There was
no dispute that Salazar had suffered from hypertension for years.
Had the Subsequent Injury Act been available, the jury could have
assigned some liability to the fund and some liability to the employer; without the act the jury had the choice of making the employer totally liable or denying Salazar's dependents any compensation.
The speculation on how various pre-existing condition cases would
have been settled had some claim been made under the Subsequent
Injury Act suggests these weaknesses in the act: (1) there is no assurance that an injury caused by a pre-existing condition will be compensated out of the subsequent injury fund; (2) the employer loses
the benefits of the subsequent injury scheme if the workman's preexisting condition was not discovered and certified to the commissioner of insurance, and (3) it is possible, indeed likely, that the
employer will remain totally liable when the workman suffers an aggravation or acceleration of a prior condition.
With these weaknesses evident, one can suspect that the New
Mexico Subsequent Injury Act as it presently exists is not able to
really promote the hiring of handicapped workers. The employer
first of all wants protection in the situation where there never would
have been an accident at all had there not been the pre-existing condition. Also, the employer must doubt the efficacy of an act where
failure to discover a medical condition precludes sharing liability
with the subsequent injury fund.
Finally, a subject not mentioned earlier is the manner in which
claims are settled. If claims are to be apportioned between the
58. Balash v. Harper, 3 N.J. 437, 70 A.2d 747 (1950) ; Rikala v. Rundquist Construction Co., 247 Minn. 401, 77 N.W.2d 551 (1956). See Herrington, supra note 39, at
170, 197.
59. 69 N.M. 464, 368 P.2d 141 (1962). See text accompanying note 35 supra.

64-4

NATURAL

RESOURCES JOURNAL

VOL. 7

employer and the subsequent injury fund,60 the need for expertise is
even greater than in the days when the determination of liability did
not require any apportioning of liability between two opposing parties. Certainly as the job of settling workmen's compensation claims
becomes more complex, there is greater justification for an administrative body abled to develop expertise through continual study
of the liability to be assessed to various factors combining to create
6
an injury. Someday New Mexico must make a successful attempt '
to establish an administrative board to hear claims arising under
various provisions of workmen's compensation.
CONCLUSION

The lack of an appellate court decisions construing the Subsequent Injury Act suggests that the act has not been discovered by
New Mexico employers. As the foregoing discussion shows, there
are numerous situations in which the act could be called upon to
share liability for a compensable injury. It is true that the present
act leaves open many questions, and frequently seems to do little to
change or shift the liability. However, as the provisions of the act
are used, improvement can come. Consequently, there is the hope
that the subsequent injury fund will become an integral part of the
workmen's compensation plan.
CLEOPATRA

CAMPBELL*

60. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 59-10-136 (Supp. 1965):
F. The term "liability shall be apportioned by the judgment" means a judicial determination of the extent of an employer's or his insurance carrier's liability under the
Workmen's Compensation Act without regard to any further and additional liability
imposed upon him or it by the Subsequent Injury Act [59-10-126 to 59-10-138] and a
further judicial determination of the benefits to which the employee is entitled to
receive as compensation for the combined condition of disability.
61. For the demise of an unsuccessful attempt, see State ex rel. Hovey Concrete
Products Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316 P.2d 1069 (1957).
* Member, Board of Editors, Natural Resources Journal, 1966-1967.

